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ABSTRACT
The paper builds a tractable model of a patent pool, an agreement among patent owners to
license a set of their patents to one another or to third parties. It first provides a necessary and
su±cient condition for a patent pool to enhance welfare. It shows that requiring pool members to be
able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing,
a property that allows the antitrust authorities to use this requirement to screen out unattractive
pools.
The paper then undertakes a number of extensions. It evaluates the "external test," according
to which patents with substitutes should not be included in a pool; analyzes the welfare implications
of the reduction in the members' incentives to invent around or challenge the validity of each other's
patents; looks at the rationale for the (common) provision of automatic assignment of future related
patents to the pool; and, last, studies the intellectual property owners' incentives to form a pool or
to cross-license when they themselves are users of the patents in the pool.
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A patent pool is an agreement among patent owners to license a set of their
patents to one another or to third parties. Patent pools have played an important
role in industry since the 1856 sewing machine pool, although their number and
importance considerably subsided in a hostile antitrust environment after World
War II. Patent pools have been making a comeback in the last few years, and
many believe that pools are bound to be as important or more important in
the new economy as in traditional sectors. Innovations in hardware, software or
biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse
set of owners.1
There is now widespread agreement among policymakers and economists that
patent pools may bene¯t both intellectual property owners and consumers, pro-
vided that the pools include patents that are complementary or blocking. It is
perhaps puzzling that so few pools have been formed in the recent past despite
the favorable treatment the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the US Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) have given to pools of complementary innovations.
This paper unveils some factors that either encourage or hinder the formation of
a pool.2 We analyze the strategic incentives to form a pool in the presence of
current and future innovations that either compete with or are complementors to
the patents in the pool.
A second focus of our analysis is the process through which competition au-
thorities examine patent pools. A recent doctrine is that only \essential patents"
1See Carlson (1999) and Gilbert (2002) for excellent historical perspectives on patent pools.
2The list of these factors is by no means exhaustive. For example, pools are less likely to
form when the owners of intellectual property have di®erent information, for example on the
social value or the e®ective duration of individual innovations. Bargaining ine±ciencies are
then bound to arise. Also, when substantial decisions have to be made after the pool is formed,
it may be di±cult to design a proper governance structure, i.e., to align the interest of pool
members.
2be included in pools. In a number of cases, an independent expert has been
assigned the role of ensuring that only essential inventions are added to the pool
and removing patents that are no longer essential in the future. In the context
of a pool de¯ning a DVD-ROM and video standard, Assistant Attorney General
Joel Klein de¯ned essentiality in the following way:3
\Essential patents, by de¯nition, have no substitutes; one needs li-
censes to each of them in order to comply with the standard."
In other words, the inventions covered by the patents in the pool must be
complements (internal test); furthermore, each individual patent admits no sub-
stitute outside the pool (external test). One may wonder whether such standards
are too strict or too lenient. By contrast, there have been historically (before
1995) almost no provisions relative to the inclusion of essential patents in pools.
Another feature of interest in the recent pools approved by American antitrust
authorities is that patent owners retain a right to license their invention separately
from the pool. 44% of the 63 pools included in the sample in Lerner et al. (2002)
allow pool members to o®er independent licenses outside the pool. When is the
independent-licensing provision bene¯cial to the members of the pool? Is it a
(presumably cheap) way of accommodating the concerns of antitrust authorities?
Shapiro (2001) uses Cournot (1838)'s analysis to point out that patent pools
raise welfare when patents are perfect complements and harm welfare when they
are perfect substitutes. While this is a useful ¯rst step in the antitrust analysis
of patent pools, patents are rarely perfect complements or perfect substitutes;
indeed, antitrust authorities sometimes wonder whether they are complements or
3Letter of Joel I. Klein to R. Carey Ramos, Esq., June 10, 1999,
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/busreview/2485.wpd.
3substitutes.4
Furthermore, most of the interesting policy issues do not arise in a world of
perfect complementarity. For example, with perfect complements, the provision
of independent licenses by patent owners and the exclusion of patents that are
not unique paths would be meaningless. Another aspect of reality that is not
well accounted for by the perfect-complements view of the world is the antitrust
requirement of a fair and reasonable royalty as a condition for the formation of
the pool. Such a condition can only prevent the emergence of a pool, even though
a pool always enhances welfare under perfect complements.
Gilbert (2002) presents a graphical analysis, which suggests that instead of
focusing on the restrictiveness of licensing terms in patent pools, antitrust author-
ities should attempt to overturn weak patents included in these arrangements.
The goal of this paper is to build a richer model, in which we can analyze
existing institutional features and antitrust policy. The paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 builds a model that allows the full range between the two
polar cases of perfectly substitutable and perfectly complementary patents, and
yet is tractable. It notes that except in the two polar cases, whether patents
are substitutes or complements depends on the level of licensing fees. Section ??
provides a necessary and su±cient condition for pools to be pro-competitive in
the absence of independent licenses. Section 4 shows that independent licenses
can be used by competition authorities as a screening device. Section 5 analyzes
the \external test," namely the absence of substitutes outside the pool. Section 6
asks whether pool formation dulls members' incentives to invent around patents
or to challenge invalid ones, and derives the corresponding welfare implications.
Section 7 analyzes the impact of pools on the members' incentives to discover
4Besides, patents that are currently complements may in the future become substitutes as
they enable new products that compete on the downstream markets.
4new technologies. Section 8 generalizes the analysis to the case in which licensors
are also licensees. Section 9 looks at asymmetric blocking patterns. Last, Section
10 summarizes the results and concludes with suggestions for further research.
2 Model
We begin with a very stylized model, and then consider progressively more real-
istic scenarios.
Intellectual property rights.
There are n owners, each of whom has a patent on one innovation. For the
moment, we assume that the formation of the pool has no real e®ects on the
amount of future innovation in the industry. We also initially assume that (a)
the number n of patents that are included in the pool is cast in stone, (b) patent
owners are not downstream users and therefore not potential licensees, and (c)
the patents are non-infringing, in the sense that each is a valid patent (patents
are, however, blocking in the sense de¯ned shortly). We will relax these three
assumptions in sections 7 through 9.
Demand for licenses.
Licensing involves no transaction or other costs. There is a continuum of





. User µ's gross surplus from using m,1· m · n, innovations
is
µ + V (m):
Unless otherwise speci¯ed, the non user-idiosyncratic component V (¢) is strictly
increasing (we will occasionally consider \limit cases" in which V (m)=V (m¡1)
for some m). Thus, the patents are blocking in the sense that it may be possible
5to employ the technology with a subset of patents, but the use of the technology
is optimized by combining as many patents as possible.
The range of the parameter µ of an idiosyncratic licensee's taste may include
negative values (adopting the technology involves a ¯xed user cost) and/or pos-
itive ones (the technology enables the user to reap network externalities or to
boost its research capability in the area). Letting F denote the cumulative dis-
tribution of µ, the demand for the bundle of the n innovations licensed at price
P is
D(P ¡ V (n) )=P r( µ + V (n) ¸ P)=1¡ F (P ¡ V (n)).
We assume that the hazard rate fÁ[1 ¡ F] is strictly increasing. This as-
sumption (which is satis¯ed by almost all familiar distributions), ensures the
strict quasi-concavity of the pool's maximization program. We will further as-
sume for conciseness that the support [µ, µ] is su±ciently wide so as to guarantee
interior solutions. In particular, µ + V (n) > 0 (otherwise, the technology would
never be used).
Motivation for the separability assumption.
There are several motivations for imposing this particular structure on user
preferences: First, it simpli¯es the analysis and exposition, as it implies that all
licensees select the same basket of licenses in the absence of a pool.
Second, the additive structure implies that it is optimal for a pool to o®er
solely a package license;5 in other words, a pool cannot screen the user's type
by o®ering, for example, a choice between the package license and licenses for
5Which they usually do: Only 12% of the pools in the Lerner et al. (2002) sample o®ered
menus of patents. To be sure, the absence of menu may have alternative motivations than
that given here. The MPEG pool, for instance, considered o®ering menus, and ultimately
rejected it. One big concern was the bargaining complexities that would be introduced, given
the uncertainty about the valuation of many of the patents and the private information that
many of the parties had about particular technologies.
6subsets of patents.6 A preference structure in which the user's type a®ects the
marginal willingness to pay for patents would induce the pool to choose a menu
of options. While such menus of options are interesting in their own right, they
would add a distracting complication for the purposes of this paper.
Third, this structure will enable us to o®er a clean description of the two
constraints faced by an independent licensor. When contemplating a licensing
fee increase, the independent licensor will worry either about her patent being
excluded from the basket of patents selected by licensees, or, when retained in
this basket, about the reduction in the overall demand for the basket. That
is, the independent licensor may be constrained by either of two margins: the
competition margin and the demand margin. Thus, the demand margin is said to
bind in equilibrium if licensors could individually raise their license price without
triggering an exclusion from the basket of patents selected by the licensees.
Substitutes and complements.
Let
w(m) ´ V (m) ¡ V (m ¡ 1) > 0
denote the users' willingness to pay for an mth patent when already having access
to m ¡ 1 patents. Because (unless otherwise speci¯ed) V is strictly increasing,
this marginal willingness to pay is strictly positive.
De¯nition 1: The surplus function is concave if w is decreasing in m and
convex if w is increasing in m.
Unless otherwise speci¯ed, we will not impose speci¯c restrictions such as
convexity or concavity on the surplus function. First, the surplus function may
6It can further be shown that pools do not bene¯t from using stochastic schemes, in which
the number of patents received and the price paid by the licensee would be random functions
of the licensee's announcement.
7be neither concave nor convex.7 Second, while there is some connection between
concavity and substitutability, and between convexity and complementarity, the
degree of complementarity cannot be de¯ned solely on this basis, as we will see.
The traditional de¯nition of substitutability (respectively, complementarity)
is that two goods are substitutes (complements) if increasing the price of one
raises (lowers) the demand for the other. Two patents may be complements,
however, at low prices and substitutes at high prices. When the prices are low,
users want to use all patents conditionally on adopting the technology; thus a
decrease in the price of one patent attracts new users to the technology and
boosts the demand for the other. By contrast, with high prices and provided the
surplus function is su±ciently concave, users may want to use a single patent and
thus the two patents compete with each other.8 With two patents the only cases
in which this reversal does not occur are the two polar cases of:
perfect substitutes: V (n)=V (1), and
perfect complements (Shapiro-Cournot case): µ+V (n¡1) · 0, and so no licensee
bene¯ts from (even a free) access to less than the full set of patents.
One of the tasks of Section 3 will be able to provide a measure of complemen-
tarity.
Demand margins for pool and independent licensors.
Let P ¤ denote the optimal price charged by the pool when patent owners
cannot issue independent licenses:
P
¤ = arg max
P
fPD(P ¡ V (n))g: (1)
7For example, implementing the technology may require a minimum number m0 of patents,
but patents become competitors beyond that level (w(m) small for m ¸ m0).
8More formally, if p1 = p2 = p<V(2)¡V (1), the two patents are complements (the demand
for each is equal to 1¡F (p1 + p2 ¡ V (2)); if p1 and p2 both exceed V (2)¡V (1) (but are smaller
than µ + V (1)), then the two patents are perfect substitutes.
8Let
^
p denote the price of individual licenses in the absence of a pool, but
assuming that consumers must take all licenses or none (in other words n
^
p is
the price of a package license o®ered by a ¯ctitious pool in which pool members
would set royalties for their patents non-cooperatively):
^





p +( n ¡ 1)
^
p ¡ V (n)
´o
: (2)
(2) has a unique solution. Furthermore, the monotone hazard rate condition
implies that reaction curves (pi = R(§j6=ipj)) are downward sloping and have
slope strictly less than 1 in absolute value. Thus there is a unique equilibrium




As we will see, independent licensors may end up charging prices below
^
p,
as licensees can pick a subset of patents. We will then say that licensors are







P = arg max
P
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D(P ¡ V (n))
o
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Under noncoordinated pricing, each licensor does not internalize the increase
in the other licensors' pro¯ts when demand for the package is increased by a
reduction in her price. This result generalizes the Shapiro-Cournot argument: If
9Suppose that p1 ·¢¢¢·pn. Then
pn ¡ p1 = R((p2 + ¢¢¢+ pn¡1)+p1) ¡ R((p2 + ¢¢¢+ pn¡1)+pn) <p n ¡ p1
unless pn = p1. Hence all prices are equal. The same will hold when we consider a subset of
demand-constrained licensors in section 3.
9the demand margin binds in the absence of pool, then a pool reduces the price
paid by users.
3 When is a pool pro-competitive?
In this section, we compare the outcome of a pool in which members are not
allowed to grant independent licenses with that in the absence of a pool. Con-
sistent with antitrust authorities' focus, we analyze the competitive impact of
the formation of a pool of existing patents (the ex post view). An ex ante view,
accounting for the pre-pool incentive to engage in R&D and thus for the impact
of the antitrust treatment of pools on the number n of innovations, might lead
to a more lenient view concerning pool formation.10
Let us characterize the pure strategy equilibrium that prevails in the absence
of a pool. Suppose that the n licensors charge prices P´(p1 ¢¢¢;p n), where
without loss of generality, p1 · p2 ·¢¢¢·pn. A user's licensing decision can be
decomposed into two steps. First, the user solves
V (P) = max
m·n
fV (m) ¡ (p1 + ¢¢¢+ pm)g:
To break ties, we will assume that the users purchase the maximum number of
patents in the optimal set whenever this program has multiple solutions.
Lemma 1.In equilibrium all licensors have positive sales. They charge the same
price if the demand margin binds, or if the competition margin binds and the
surplus function is concave. Otherwise, there exists an equilibrium (on which we
will focus) in which prices are equal.
10Such an approach would be in line with Denicolo (2002), who considers sequential innova-
tion in a two-stage patent race model and argues that the prospect of an agreement between the
owners of competing, sequential, but non-infringing patents increases investment in the second
innovation and may raise welfare.
10The proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. Intuitively, with a zero marginal
cost, a licensor with no sales would be better o® lowering his price until users
purchase a license. The existence of symmetric equilibria is unsurprising given
the symmetric structure of the model. When the competition margin binds and
the surplus function is nonconcave, asymmetric equilibria may arise, which we
will ignore for expositional conciseness.
Let p = z(n) denote the maximal possible price p satisfying:
V (n) ¡ np = max
m<n
fV (m) ¡ mpg.
In words, in a symmetric price con¯guration with price z(n), licensors are con-
strained by the competition margin. Note that z(n) is independent of the distri-




(since users can select n ¡ 1 patents), possibly with strict inequality.12
Let
Z(n) ´ nz(n),
De¯nition. Fixing V (n), patents are said to be more substitutable when Z(n)
decreases.
11For example, for V (m)=( m=n)
® with ®<1, z(n)=w(n)=1¡ ((n ¡ 1)=n)
® converges
to 0 as ® converges to 0 (that is when patents become close substitutes).
12Suppose n =3 ,fV (0) = 0, V (1) = 5, V (2) = 5 and V (3) = 8g (a possible interpretation
is that one patent su±ces for a low-quality production, while the full set is necessary for a
high-quality one). Then w(n) = 3 while z(n)=1 :5.
11Note that Z(n) is a measure of complementarity among pool patents given
that the user has made the choice to go for this technology. Suppose, for example,
that V is concave and so patents can be viewed as substitutes. If µ<0 (using
the technology covered by the patents involves a ¯xed cost), then the marginal
bene¯t of the second, third,... patents may exceed the marginal bene¯t of the
¯rst. In that sense, the patents also exhibit some complementarity.
Proposition 1 (absence of pool)
(i) If z(n) D0 (Z(n) ¡ V (n))+D(Z(n) ¡ V (n)) > 0 then licensors are constrained
only by the competition margin and charge equilibrium price z(n).
(ii) If z(n) D0 (Z(n) ¡ V (n)) + D(Z(n) ¡ V (n)) < 0, then licensors are con-
strained only by the demand margin, and b p<z (n).
Let us derive some comparative statics from this proposition. Let us index
the distribution of types by a parameter °: F (µ j °). It is standard to compare
distributions through their hazard rates. Parameter °1 corresponds to a lower
demand (and higher elasticity) than parameter °2 if for all µ
f (µ j °2)
1 ¡ F (µ j °2)
<
f (µ j °1)
1 ¡ F (µ j °1)
:
The following corollary follows directly from Proposition 1:
Corollary: If the competition margin binds for parameter °1, then it binds a
fortiori for parameter °2.
In words, the competition margin is more likely to bind when the demand
grows. The intuition is that if the demand margin binds, licensors increase their
prices when the elasticity decreases. Licensees are then more tempted to do with
a limited set of patents.
12Proposition 2 (normative analysis of pool)
(i) A pool always increases welfare when the demand margin binds in the absence
of pool.
(ii) A pool may increase or decrease welfare when the competition margin binds
in the absence of a pool, depending on whether P ¤ 7 Z(n):
Part (i) of the proposition results from inequality (3). Part (ii) is a direct
corollary of the fact that each licensor charges z(n) when the competition margin
binds in the absence of a pool.
Next note that, ¯xing V (n), the pool price P ¤ depends only on the elasticity
of the demand curve, and not on the substitutability Z(n) among patents. Con-
versely, Z(n) depends on the surplus function V (¢), but not on the elasticity of
the demand curve. This means that the competition and the demand margins
are conceptually distinct.
A simple corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 is
Proposition 3 (substitutability among patents) As patents become more substi-
tutable (Z(n) decreases),
(i) the competition margin is more likely to bind (since it binds if and only if
Z(n) · b P),
(ii) the pool is more likely to decrease welfare (it does so if and only if Z(n) <P ¤).















134 Independent licenses as a screening mecha-
nism
Patent owners who request a statement of the Department of Justice's antitrust
enforcement intentions with respect to a proposed pool arrangement usually in-
clude the provision that the individual patents that are part of the pool may still
be licensed from the original patents' owners.13 Indeed, this is one line of depar-
ture between a merger and a pool. In the context of a pool, the patent owners
(the counterparts of the merging parties) still act independently and maximize
their own pro¯ts. They just agree to market a jointly produced \good " { the
package license { at some pre-agreed price { the royalty rate.
This common provision raises two related questions: First, what is the cost
for pool members of including this provision (given that the pool administrator
could o®er individual patent licenses and not only the package license14)? Second,
would it be optimal for antitrust authorities to insist on this provision?
We consider a two-stage game following the constitution of the pool:
(i) The pool chooses a price P for its bundle (so as to maximize pool pro¯t).
(ii) Owners non-cooperatively and simultaneously set license prices (p1;p 2;:::;pn)
for their individual patents.
We will say that the pool is weakly (strongly) stable to independent licensing
if, when the pool charges P ¤, the pool-pro¯t maximizing price when there is no
independent licensing, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium of stage (ii) such
13The independent licensing provision is by no means speci¯c to the recent pools that have
obtained review letters from the Department of Justice.
14For di®erent speci¯cations of user preferences, the pool might want to issue sublicenses;
but recall that we have chosen licensees' preferences so that it is optimal for the pool to o®er
only the package license.
14that (respectively, in all pure-strategy equilibria of stage (ii)) users buy solely
from the pool.
Let us consider the two cases identi¯ed in Proposition 1.
Suppose ¯rst that the licensors are constrained by the demand margin in the
absence of a pool. Suppose that the pool sets package price P ¤, and so each
licensor receives p¤ = P ¤=n from each sale of the package if users prefer to buy
the bundle to purchasing independent licenses. We know that p¤ < b p<z (n).
Suppose that the independent licensors o®er prices (p1 ¢¢¢;p n) that induce users
to buy independent licenses rather than from the pool. By the same reasoning
as in section 3, all licensors then sell independent licenses, and so if license n is
the highest price license, pn · z(n). Furthermore, by assumption,
V (n) ¡ P ¤ <V(n) ¡ §n
1pn:
Because §n
1pn ´ P<P ¤ < b P,
(P=n)D0 (P ¡ V (n)) + D(P ¡ V (n)) > 0.
So marginal revenue is positive at least for licensor 1, the lowest-price independent
licensor, who therefore would bene¯t from raising his price. Hence, p1 = ¢¢¢=
pn = z(n). But then P = Z(n) >P ¤, a contradiction. The pool is not only
bene¯cial but also strongly stable.
Second, assume that the licensors are constrained by the competition margin
in the absence of a pool. If the pool is bene¯cial, that is if P ¤ <Z (n) < b P,
the same reasoning as previously shows that the pool is strongly stable. Let us
therefore assume that the pool reduces welfare in the absence of independent
licensing:
Z(n) <P ¤ < b P.
15Note ¯rst that the pool can't be strongly stable. Indeed there always exists a
\run" in which licensors charge the competition margin z(n) each (and by the
local analysis of section 3, this is the only equilibrium in which the pool is upset).
Licensors would be better o® tying their hands to the mast, but cannot refrain
from issuing independent licenses when others do.
Does there also exist a \no-run equilibrium" in which the pool is able to
sell at price P ¤? More generally, what prices P can the pool charge for the
package license such that which the owners not o®ering independent licenses is





· V (n)¡ P,




when upsetting the pool.
For example, price P ¤ can be sustained in the concave case if and only if
V (1) ¡ p¤ · V (n)¡ P ¤,
or
V (n) ¡ V (1) ¸ (n ¡ 1)p¤.
This inequality may or may not be satis¯ed (since p¤ >z (n)=w(n) by assump-
tion).
Proposition 4 (independent licensing by pool members)
(i) A welfare-enhancing pool is strongly stable to independent licensing by pool
members.
(ii) A welfare-decreasing pool is not strongly stable, and may or may not be weakly
stable. When under the threat of a run, the pool cannot charge more than in
the absence of pool. With better coordinated licensors, though, higher prices are
sustainable, perhaps even the pool price in the absence of independent licensing.
(iii) For n =2 , individual licenses yield the same outcome as in the absence of
16a pool when the latter is welfare decreasing (and, from (i), have no e®ect if the
pool is welfare enhancing).
We thus conclude that independent licensing is irrelevant for a welfare-enhancing
pool, and may but need not reduce prices in the case of a welfare-reducing pool.
5 Essential patents and competition from out-
side the pool
Recall that there are two facets to essentiality: First, the patents included in the
pool must be complements (internal test). Second, patents in the pool must not
have close substitutes outside the pool (external test). The general fear is that
the inclusion of a patent in the pool could foreclose competing patents outside
the pools:15
\the inclusion in the pool of only one of the competing non-essential
patents, which the pool would convey along with the essential patents,
could in certain cases unreasonably foreclose the non-included com-
peting patents from use by manufacturers; because the manufacturers
would obtain a license to the one patent with the pool, they might
choose not to license any of the competing patents, even if they oth-
erwise would regard the competitive patents as superior."
It is not clear, though, that it is in the interest of pool members to include
one of the competing patents. From the Chicago school critique of the foreclosure
doctrine, as articulated in Whinston (1990), we know that it is often not in the
15Joel Klein's ("Letter to Carey R. Ramos," June 10, 1999, page 11) response to the request
by Toshiba and other patent owners to form a pool with regards to the DVD-ROM and DVD-
video formats.
17interest of ¯rms to bundle competitive products with complementary noncompet-
itive ones, because the reduction in product variety in the competitive segment
reduces the attractiveness of the complementary noncompetitive products. While
bundling may in some speci¯c cases bene¯t the owners of the bottleneck products,
there is no presumption that it in general does.
To analyze the issue of over-inclusiveness and the possibility of foreclosure,
suppose that there are n + 1 technologies. Each of technologies i =1 ;¢¢¢;n is
a \unique path". Technology n + 1 is covered by two competing, non-infringing
patents. The two patents are perfect substitutes from the point of view of li-
censees.
We will say that the pool is
² non-inclusive if it covers only technologies 1;¢¢¢;n,
² inclusive if it covers technologies 1;¢¢¢;nas well as one of the patents for
technology n +1 .
We now show that inclusiveness does not a®ect pro¯ts and welfare as long as
technology n+1 has (as has been assumed until now) no alternative use, but that
it may have a substantial impact if at least a small number of users are interested
in technology n + 1 on a stand-alone basis (for a di®erent type of application).
So let us introduce another category of consumers, who are interested only in
technology n + 1 and are willing to pay v> 0 for it. The timing goes as follows:
(1) The owners of technology 1;¢¢¢;nform a pool and decide whether to invite
one of the owners of technology n + 1 to join it. In its charter, the pool
decides whether the pool administrator is entitled to o®er menus or only
the entire package of the pool's technologies.
18(2) The pool administrator (who maximizes pool pro¯t) and the independent
owner(s) of technology n + 1 set prices.
The choice of whether to allow pool administrators to o®er menus and not
only the whole bundle that pools face here is a standard one. In the Lerner et al.
(2002) sample, only 12% of the pools elected to o®er menus.
Suppose ¯rst that the pool is non-inclusive. Then Bertrand competition be-
tween technology n + 1 owners brings its price down to zero. The pool charges
either P ¤, where
P ¤ = argmaxfPD(P ¡ V (n + 1))g
if the demand margin binds, or e P given by
V (n +1 )¡ e P = V (1),
if the competition margin binds (i.e., if V (n +1 )¡ P ¤ <V(1)).
Suppose next that the pool is inclusive and owners are not allowed to license
their IP independently. If the pool elects to o®er a menu, the outcome is the same
as under non-inclusiveness, since the pool and the independent owner compete µ a
la Bertrand in the market to the (n +1 )
st technology. Suppose therefore that the
inclusive pool chooses not to o®er menus.
If, under non-inclusiveness, the demand margin is binding
³
P ¤ < e P
´
, then the
pool charges P ¤, and the independent owner focuses on the stand-alone demand
and charges pn+1 =v for technology n+1. The pool's pro¯t is unchanged, prices
are higher, but in this speci¯cation no deadweight loss is created. (If the stand-
alone demand were elastic, this third conclusion would not hold, and welfare
would decrease).
If the competition margin binds under non-inclusiveness
³
P ¤ > e P
´
, note ¯rst
that the independent owner can guarantee himself a minimal pro¯t equal to v
times the stand-alone demand by charging pn+1 =v. This implies that there
19exists p> 0 such that prices pn+1 <p are strongly dominated for the independent
owner. Hence the pool can charge at least e P 0 such that
V (n +1 )¡ e P 0 = V (1)¡p.
Hence the pool has increased its pro¯t.16
Last, consider an inclusive pool allowing for independent licensing by its mem-
bers. In (the unique pure-strategy17) equilibrium, Bertrand competition between
the owners of technology n + 1 drives its price to zero. The outcome is then the
same as for a non-inclusive pool.
Proposition 5 (overinclusive pools) Consider a non-inclusive pool of n patents
and an (n +1 ) st technology covered by two noninfringing and competing patents
and facing a stand-alone demand.
(i) The pool cannot increase its pro¯t by including one of the competing patents
if the demand margin binds.
(ii) If the competition margin binds, the pool increases its pro¯t by including
one of the competing patents and welfare is then reduced. Independent licensing
annihilates the impact of inclusiveness, though.
To increase its pro¯t, the pool uses a \raise-your-user's cost" strategy: It re-
duces the competition for stand-alone uses of technology n + 1 by absorbing one
of the competitors and by choosing to o®er only the bundle of patents. When the
competition margin is binding, the pool is constrained by its competition with
technology n + 1,which is thereby relaxed. This raise-your-user's-cost strategy
combines the raise-your-rival's-cost strategy of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990)
16The price equilibrium (P, pn+1) is here in mixed strategies, and is straightforward to derive.
17Such games also often have a mixed-strategy equilibrium (Baye-Morgan 1996). We have
not investigated the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria in this particular game (which has
asymmetric costs, due to the members' opportunity costs).
20and Judd's (1985) avoidance of direct competition in a multi-product environ-
ment.
In Ordover et al., the vertical integration of an upstream ¯rm with market
power with a downstream producer reduces downstream competition by expos-
ing the downstream competitors to the exercise of market power by the other
upstream supplier. Ordover et al. assumed that the integrated upstream supplier
can commit not to undercut its upstream rival for the business of unintegrated
buyers even though such undercutting is pro¯table. A similar play happens here,
and we motivate the commitment assumption through the choice of pool char-
ter, namely of whether the pool administrator markets a package license only or
o®ers a menu of choices to users.18 The pool's strategy is also related to Judd's
analysis of a multi-product ¯rm, which exits one of the markets (here, the market
for stand-alone uses) so as to soften price competition in that market and not to
cannibalize another market (here, the market for bundles of patents).
Last, note the conditions needed for this strategy to be successful (besides the
prohibition of independent licensing already mentioned):
(i) the competition margin must be binding. If the demand margin is binding,
the name of the game for the n unique-path-technology patent owners is to get
as low a price for the (n + 1)th technology as feasible, which can be achieved
equally well by Bertrand competition or by an inclusion in the pool;
(ii) inclusiveness and bundling must substantially reduce the intensity of compe-
tition on the market for stand-alone uses. If there were many substitute patents
for technology n+1, then including one of them into the pool would hardly raise
price for the n+1 th technology and therefore hardly reduce the competition for
the pool when the competition margin binds;
18Another di®erence with Ordover et al. is that the unintegrated \upstream" supplier serves
the pool's users directly rather than through a downstream supplier.
21(iii) on a related note, the price of the (n + 1)th technology would not increase
if one of the suppliers of that technology kept its price constant for institutional
reasons, as in the case of a software program covered by an open source license.19
6 Impact on circumvention strategies
Concerns have been raised concerning the possibility that pools dull incentives
for future innovation. This section and the next analyze how pools change their
members' incentives to a) circumvent (invent around) each other's patents and
b) to discover new technologies related to the pool.
When users combine multiple patents, a decrease in the price of a patent
augments the overall demand for the other patents. A patent owner may there-
fore want to take actions that lower the user price of other technologies. They
may invent around these technologies or else attempt at getting the correspond-
ing patents invalidated. The incentive to engage in such \circumvention strate-
gies" are altered by the formation of a patent pool joint venture. This section
investigates the private and social incentive for circumvention in a two-patent
environment.
6.1 Pools and incentives to invent around
Consider for simplicity two patents, and suppose that the owner of patent 1 has
the opportunity to develop a noninfringing perfect substitute for the technology
covered by patent 2, at some cost c ¸ 0.
a) No pool.
a1) In the absence of pool and when owner 1 does not circumvent, suppose ¯rst
that the demand margin binds. Each owner charges b p such that
19We are grateful to Nancy Gallini for this suggestion.
22b p = argmaxfpD(p + b p ¡ V (2))g:
The price of the bundle is then b P =2 b p.
Circumvention then enables owner 1 to bring the price of innovation 2 to zero
and to charge e p ´ minfP ¤, w(2)g, where P ¤ = argmaxfpD(p ¡ V (2))g and
w(2) = V (2)¡V (1), for patent 1. And so circumvention is pro¯table if and only
if





b P ¡ V (2)
´
>c :
It then reduces the total price and thereby bene¯ts consumers.
a2) When the competition margin binds, each owner charges
p = w(2) = V (2) ¡ V (1)
in the absence of circumvention. The price of the bundle is then W(2) = 2w(2).
When owner 1 invents around owner 2's patent, owner 1 still charges the same
price, but there is more demand since technology 2 is now free. Thus, owner 1
invents around if and only if
w(2)D(w(2) ¡ V (2)) ¡ w(2)D(W(2) ¡ V (2)) >c :
Again, consumers bene¯t from the circumvention strategy.
23b) Pool.
We assume that there is no independent licensing and that the pool admin-
istrator is instructed to maximize pool pro¯t. If owner 1 does not invent around
patent 2, the pool charges P ¤ for the bundle and the pool pro¯t
P
¤D(P
¤ ¡ V (2))
is divided between the two members. (Pro¯t may be shared unequally between
the two members. Indeed, for c close to 0, owner 1 can guarantee herself a pro¯t
close to P ¤D(P ¤ ¡ V (2)) when innovations are almost perfect complements, by
not entering a pool and inventing around owner 2's patent. Hence, an unequal
division of pool pro¯t20 may be required for pool formation.)
Suppose now that owner 1 invents around patent 2. Either P ¤ <w (2) and
the pool keeps charging P ¤ (circumvention is irrelevant); or P ¤ >w (2) and the
pool may need to reduce its price.21 In either case, circumvention brings no new
revenue (and may jeopardize the existing one) for owner 1.
But even if the absence of pool induces circumvention, the welfare analysis
may turn in favor of the pool. Take for instance case a1) (the demand margin
binds) when e p = P ¤. The ¯nal outcome is then the same as in the presence of
a pool, except for the wasted duplication cost c. Owner 1 expands resources in
order to reduce the price of complementary technology 2, and this cost could be
avoided by the formation of a pool.
20An example of a patent pool in which royalties were distributed (very) unequally is the
1917 Manufacturers Aircraft Association, in which members had to pay per plane $135 to
Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation and $40 to Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corporation.
21Whether it does so depends on whether ®P¤ is larger or smaller than w(2) where ® · 1i s
owner 1's share of dividends in the pool. Owner 1 may be reluctant to o®er a low price for its
me-too version of technology 2 since this cannibalizes the pool (from which he receives a share
of the dividends) with an inferior product (with quality di®erence w(2)).
24Proposition 6 (incentives to invent around) Consider a two-member pool in
which the owner of patent 1 can invent around patent 2.
(i) Owner 1 never invents around patent 2 when a pool is formed.
(ii) Owner 1 invents around patent 2 in the absence of a pool if the cost of
doing so is small enough. Circumvention in the absence of pool may, however, be
welfare-dominated by a pool.
The analysis is summarized in Figure 2. That a pool has a negative welfare
impact when w(2) <P ¤=2 results from Proposition 4 (in the absence of cir-
cumvention possibility, pools reduce welfare) and from our observation that the
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Figure 2
256.2 Invalidation of a bogus patent as a circumvention strat-
egy
Concern has been repeatedly voiced as to the possibility that patent pools be used
to shelter bogus patents. For example, in 1998 the US Federal Trade Commission
challenged the Summit-VISX pool because, inter alia,22 it was shielding an invalid
patent. The reasoning was that one company would have sued the other for use
of an invalid patent, but for the creation of the pool.
While widely accepted, the argument that the inclusion of bogus patents
in a pool is welfare detrimental has not been fully articulated. With perfect
complements, for example, the inclusion of an invalid patent into a pool leads
to a package-price reduction if the cost of obtaining an invalidation is too high,
and to the economizing of legal costs if the latter are low enough to justify the
invalidation process; in either case, the inclusion of the bogus patent into a pool
is welfare enhancing.
Let us therefore analyze the bogus patent problem in a bit more detail. Sup-
pose that there are two owners, and that patent 2 can at some cost c be proved
invalid. We assume that patent 2 was actually covered by prior art or else ob-
vious. Furthermore, only owner 1 can initiate the invalidation process; the other
stakeholders, the users, are too dispersed and are assumed not to be able to solve
their collective action problem (recall that proving that patent 2 is invalid is
costly).
22The companies were also charged with unlawful price ¯xing involving their patent pool.
26Consider the following timing in the absence of a pool:23
(i) Owner 1 decides on whether to incur cost c to make patent 2 invalid. If he
does, then technology 2 is available to everyone for free.
(ii) Owner 1 and (if his patent is not proved invalid) owner 2 set prices for their
licenses.
Note that the impact of the invalidation process is the same as that of the
circumvention strategy of Section 6.1: It brings the price p2 of technology 2 down
to zero. Thus the analysis of the private and social impacts of the invalidation
process is identical to that of Section 6.1.
In case of a pool, owner 1 can still call for an invalidation, but in that case
he clearly \shoots himself in the foot" since he creates more competition for the
pool package on which he receives royalties. Thus the pool outcome is also the
same as in Section 6.1.
Proposition 7 (bogus patent). Suppose that n =2and that patent 2 can at some
cost c be challenged by the owner of patent 1 for invalidation, as it is obvious or
covered by prior art.
(i) Owner 1 does not challenge the bogus patent 2 when a pool is formed.
(ii) Owner 1 challenges the bogus patent 2 in the absence of a pool if the cost c is
small enough. Such a challenge may, however, be welfare-dominated by a pool.
23We could alternatively consider the \reverse timing" in which owner 2 is able to (long term)
commit to a price p2 for licenses before owner 1 decides whether to sue. Then owner 2 practices
\limit pricing" so as to fend o® a lawsuit by owner 1: It sets p2 so that
max
p1·w(2)
fp1D(p1 ¡ V (2))g¡ max
p1·w(2)
fp1D(p1 + p2 ¡ V (2))g = c.
The analysis is then similar, although a bit more complex than that developed below.
277 Assignment of future related patents to the
pool
Pools can a®ect the innovation market by requiring that their members assign
their future related patents that are deemed essential to the pool. There is no
denying that such a term (which can be found in 46 of the 63 pools studied by
Lerner et al. (2002)) has the potential to dull incentives for innovation and to
thereby reduce welfare.
This section instead focuses on the e±ciency defense for the provision. A
recurrent concern of pools is that they may be held up in the future by innovations
brought about by their members. The duty to disclose any patent application
that is relevant to the pool addresses the concern that an existing innovation will
in the future confront the pool. By contrast, we are interested in innovations that
can be but are not yet made, or else whose current existence can be e®ectively
concealed by the members.
Let us for simplicity consider a two-patent, two-member pool (n = 2). A third
innovation is feasible at some cost c, which only one of the two members has the
capability to discover. For simplicity, we assume that all patents (whether there
are two or three) are su±ciently complementary so that it is always the demand
margin that binds.
Consider the following two-period timing:
At date 1, one of the owners, owner 2, say, identi¯es that he has the capability
to bring about the third innovation. The two owners then bargain on whether to
form a two-patent pool and, if so, whether to add a term specifying that related
patents (here, the patent on innovation 3) must be assigned to the pool. The
two existing patents are then licensed, either by their owners, if a pool has not





































been formed, or as a package by the pool otherwise. At date 2, owner 2 decides
whether to spend c to innovate. Then, a three-patent pool is formed if he has
innovated, or a two-patent pool is formed if he has not innovated and no pool
has been formed at date 1. At date 2, licenses are issued to the users.
Letting ¼t




i +( 1¡ X)¼
2
i
(where for interest rate r and length T of period 1, X ´ 1 ¡ e¡rT.S oX ' 0i f
T is low, and X ' 1i fT is large).
We assume that
(i) all bargaining is Nash bargaining: Owner i obtains
¼i =
¼¤ +[ ¼i (0) ¡ ¼j (0)]
2
;
when the joint pro¯t to agreeing is ¼¤, and the status-quo pro¯ts in the absence
of agreement are ¼¢ (0);
29(ii) pool members share royalties equally (we will relax this assumption later);
(iii) pool members are cash constrained: They don't have enough liquidity to




n ´ maxfPD(P ¡ V (n))g
denote the pro¯t of a n-patent pool.
Let us work by backward induction. Suppose that owner 2 has innovated and
consider the negotiation for the formation of a three-patent pool. In the presence
of an existing two-patent pool, and in the absence of inclusion of the third patent
into the pool, the pool administrator then charges P for the bundle of the ¯rst
two patents, and owner 2 charges p3 for the third patent. They solve, respectively
(assuming that pool royalties are shared equally):
max
P









D(P + p3 ¡ V (3))
¾
:
The ¯rst-order conditions imply that
P =2 p3:
Hence, if the renegotiation to a more e±cient three-patent pool (that eliminates
the double marginalization) were to break down, owner 2 would make twice as
much pro¯t as owner 1 (¼2 (0) = 2¼1 (0)). This puts him in a very strong bar-
gaining position.
By contrast, suppose that no such two-patent pool was formed at date 1.
Then, owner 1 charges p1 for patent 1, and owner 2 charges some P for the
30bundle of patents 2 and 3. They solve, respectively,
max
p1




fPD(p1 + P ¡ V (3))g.
Hence
p1 = P:
Thus, if the renegotiation to the three-patent pool were to break down, owner 2
would make as much pro¯t as owner 1 (¼2 (0) = ¼1 (0)). His bargaining position
is thus not as strong as in the presence of a pool. Indeed, they share ¼¤
3 equally,
exactly as when a pool has been formed at date 1 with the provision that new
patents are assigned without compensation to the pool!
Let us now turn to owner 2's incentive to bring about the third innovation.







if either no pool was formed at date 1 or a pool with an automatic assignment




3 +( ¼2 (0) ¡ ¼1 (0))] ¡ ¼¤
2
2
(where c¤¤ >c ¤) if a pool without automatic assignment was formed. The ability
to hold-up the pool thus raises owner 2's incentive to innovate.
Last, we look at owner 1's incentive to join a pool at date 1:
Proposition 8 (i) Owner 1, when contemplating whether to form a pool at date
1, faces a trade-o® between delaying the formation of a pool and creating a double
31marginalization at date 1 (this cost is small if X is small), and avoiding the hold-
up by not joining the pool. An alternative way to prevent this hold-up is to insist
on an automatic assignment term; this term however may dull the incentive for
innovation.
If c · c¤, then owner 1 accepts (and actually is eager to ) join a pool with
automatic assignment.
If c>c ¤, then owner 1 accepts to join a pool without automatic assignment.
(ii) A legal prohibition on automatic assignments prevents the formation of a pool
whenever c · c¤ and X · X¤ for some X¤ 2 (0;1), and is then welfare decreasing
(it is neutral otherwise).
Remark 1: Note the role of assumption (iii). The impossibility to make ex
ante lump sum transfers implies that owner 1 cannot obtain compensation for the
hold-up. Hence owner 1 can protect himself from a hold-up only by insisting on an
automatic assignment (which does not discourage innovation if the latter's cost is
below c¤) or by not joining a pool. A legal prohibition on automatic assignments
may lower welfare by forcing owner 1 to protect himself in a socially wasteful
manner.
Remark 2: Turning to assumption that pool members share royalties equally,
when a legal prohibition on automatic assignments prevents the pool from forming
( c · c¤ and X · X¤), note that owner 2 can use the sharing of royalties in order
to convince a reluctant owner 1 to create a two-patent pool. That is, royalty
sharing favorable to owner 1 can be a substitute for a lump sum transfer.24 Note
24In the presence of a third innovation, suppose that owner i receives a share ®i (®1+®2 =1 )
of the royalties of the two-patent pool. Then owner 2's choice of licensing price p3 solves
max
p3
f(®2P + p3)D(P + p3 ¡ V (3))g:
In particular, owner 2's taking no royalties eliminates the hold-up problem: For ®2 =0 ,P =
32also that in a more general environment, in which, say, the innovation cost were
random, one would expect owner 2's royalty rate to be \backloaded" (that is,
increased when innovation 3 is added to the pool) so as to enhance his incentive
for innovation.
8 Licensors are also licensees
We have until now analyzed pools whose members are upstream patent owners
and license to third-party downstream users. Let us now allow licensors to be
also licensees. We focus on the other polar case in which the pool does not o®fer
licenses to third parties. Its n members form a symmetric n-¯rm downstream
oligopoly. Users pay royalty rate (or access charge) a to the pool, whose pro¯t is
then redistributed equally among its members. For simplicity, let us assume that
n =2 .
Patent owners who are also downstream competitors will never want to join a
pool, if the pooling of their patents make them undi®erentiated. To account for
pool formation we therefore assume that the two ¯rms are di®erentiated in two
ways (the following analysis is inspired by the \double di®erentiation model" in
Hausman et al. (2001)). The ¯rst dimension of di®erentiation is technology unre-
lated; the two ¯rms are located at the two extremes of an Hotelling segment [0;1].
Consumers are located uniformly on the segment and incur unit transportation
cost t.
Second, patents 1 and 2 describe two technologies that are di®erently suited
to the needs of the consumers. Namely, patents 1 and 2 are located at the two
extremes of an Hotelling segment [0;1], and consumers are uniformly25 distributed
®1P = p3. Such an arrangement, however, need not be agreeable to owner 2.
25The results in Hausman et al. hold for arbitrary distributions. The assumption of uniform
distributions is used here to show that the markup increases with di®erentiation, and is much
33along that segment (independent of their location in the other dimension), with
transportation cost u per unit of distance.
Pooling the patents then allows both ¯rms to o®er a better service to con-
sumers: each can o®er the patent 1- and patent 2-enabled versions and so con-
sumers haver a better match for their needs.
(a) No pool.
If x and y denote the locations of a consumer in the \natural" di®erentiation
space and the technology space, and p1 and p2 denote the prices charged by the
¯rms in the absence of pool, then the consumer selects ¯rm 1 if and only if
p1 + tx + uy· p2 + t(1 ¡ x)+u(1 ¡ y).
The outcome is the Hotelling outcome (p¤, p¤) for marginal cost 0 and a di®eren-
tiation that is the convolution of the two di®erentiations.26One has p¤ >t(unless
u = 0, in which case p¤ = t).
(b) Pool.
In case of a pool with royalty rate a, the opportunity cost of stealing a cus-
tomer from one's rival is equal to a (given that the dividend a=2 accrues to the
¯rm regardless of who serves the consumer). Each ¯rm o®ers the patent 1- and
patent 2-enabled versions and the unique price equilibrium is:
p
¤ = a + t.
(see Hausman et al. 2001). The intuition is that each ¯rm charges a fee to
consumers equal to the opportunity cost of acquiring the consumer plus the dif-
stronger than needed.


















h(y)dy, where K and H denote the cumulative distributions (here, the identity
on [0;1]) of variables x and y.
34ferentiation markup, and lets the consumers select the version that best suits
them by not charging di®erent prices for di®erent versions.27
Even if a = 0, a pool may bene¯t the two ¯rms because of demand augmenta-
tion. To capture this demand augmentation e®ect in a tractable way (that is, not
interferring with the double-di®erentiation analysis above), let us assume that
users are ex ante identical.28 At \search or set up cost" s, they adapt their tech-
nology to that covered by the two patents, and learn about their own locations
in the two spaces. Letting v denote the gross surplus, a user spends the search
cost s if and only if s · s¤, where
s
¤




fa + t + t j x ¡ xi j +u j y ¡ yj jg
¾
under a pool, and
s¤




fp¤ + t j x ¡ xi j +u j y ¡ yi jg
¾
in the absence of a pool. The distribution of s in the population is given by the
cumulative G(s), and so total demand is G(s¤
P) under a pool and G(s¤
NP)i n
the absence of a pool. We assume that the hazard rate g=G is decreasing so as
to guarantee the concavity of pro¯t functions. A pool creates a better ¯t and,
keeping prices constant, increases demand.
The per-¯rm pro¯t is
¼P (a)=
G(s¤
P (a + t))
2
(a + t)







27The result is obvious when the two patents are incorporated in the good (say, a software)
manufactured by the ¯rms, which then do not o®er multiple versions. The intuition given above
refers to the versioning case.
28This simpli¯cation is also used in Hausman et al (2001).
35in the absence of a pool.
The monotone hazard rate condition together with the linearity of s¤
P (¢) imply
that ¼P is concave. Last, note that s¤
P (p) <s ¤
NP (p) for all p (a pool allows for
better quality o®ers). We can thus conclude that:
Proposition 9 (i) There exists a(t,u) ¸ 0 and a(t,u) such that a pool is formed
if and only if a 2 [a(t,u) , a(t,u)].
(ii) Firms may have too little incentive to form a pool if a is constrained to
be equal to 0. Provided that the no-pool equilibrium price p¤ increases with the
¯rms' patent-related di®erentiation parameter u, a pool forms (under the no-
royalty constraint) if patents are close substitutes (u small) or very di®erentiated
(u large), but may not form for intermediate values. A no-royalty pool never
forms if the ¯rms are little di®erentiated along the non-patent-related dimension.
(iii) The socially optimal royalty rate among those that induce the ¯rms to form
a pool is a = a.
9 Asymmetries in blocking patterns
This section shows how our model can help study asymmetric situations in which,
say, subservient patent 2 improves patent 1, i.e., enables better products than
patent 1 alone, but has no value on a stand-alone basis. That is, patent 2 is
valueless without patent 1, while patent 1 on a stand-alone basis delivers gross
surplus µ + V (1) to user µ (whom we assume to be a third-party user). For
simplicity, we assume that n =2 .
As it turns out, the antitrust implications of pools are rather straightforward
in this case, as shown by the following proposition proved in the Appendix:
Proposition 10 With the asymmetric, dominant / subservient pattern,
36(i) independent licenses have no bite, and
(ii) pools unambiguously enhance welfare.
The key to understanding why pools are always welfare enhancing here is to
note that, by assumption, the subservient patent is valueless on a stand-alone ba-
sis, and so the demand margin always binds for the dominant patent; this property
creates a potential double marginalization, and thereby a potential social gain to
the formation of a pool.
Remark: The analysis of Section 6.1 can be extended to the asymmetric block-
ing pattern in order to qualify Proposition 10. In particular, the owner of the
subservient pattern may be able to invent around the dominant pattern, creating
strong Bertrand competition if the subservient patent brings about only a minor
improvement. The formation of a pool dulls this incentive if either the pool pro-
hibits independent licensing or the pool allows it and gives a high share of the
royalties to owner 2.
10 Summary and concluding remarks
The paper has built a tractable model of a patent portfolio, that allows for the full
range of complementarity/substitutability. In the absence of pool, the demand
margin binds if an increase in the license price of a patent leads to a reduction in
the demand for the patent basket; the competition margin binds if it leads to the
exclusion of the patent from the basket selected by users. Let us ¯rst summarize
the main insights:
a) Pro-competitive pools: A pool is more likely to be welfare-enhancing if patents
are more complementary. That the demand margin binds in the absence of pool
is a su±cient, but not a necessary condition for a pool to be welfare-enhancing.
37b) Independent licenses as a screening device: A pool is never a®ected by the
possibility of independent licensing if and only if the pool is welfare-enhancing.
Furthermore, with only two patents, independent licensing always yields the same
outcome as in the absence of a pool if the pool is welfare-decreasing in the absence
of independent licenses. With more than two patents and a welfare-decreasing
pool, independent licensing in general gives rise to multiple equilibrium outcomes.
c) External test: The inclusion of one of a set of substitute patents into the
pool under some circumstances decreases welfare. This detrimental e®ect can be
avoided through the use of independent licenses.
d) Circumvention strategies: Pools dull their members' incentives to invent around
or to try to invalidate pool patents held by other members. Even so, pools may
have bene¯cial e®ects, except in the case of strong substitutes.
e) Licensors as licensees: Pools reduce the di®erentiation of downstream users
when the latter are the licensors. A positive royalty rate in such pools/cross
licenses may be what it takes to induce the welfare-enhancing sharing of innova-
tion among competitors, although public oversight of the royalty rates may still
be needed in order to prevent excessive levels.
f)Assignment of future patents: The provision of assigning future related patents
to the pool, while having a potential anticompetitive e®ect may be a response to
the possibility of future hold-up problems.
This paper is a ¯rst step in the analysis of factors that encourage or hinder
the formation of patent pools and of the checklist that should be employed by
competition authorities in their review of pools. Looking forward, our theoretical
understanding of patent pools should be deepened in several directions.
First, our assumption of separability of user preferences, while simplifying
the analysis, focused it on package licensing and ruled out price discrimination
38through menus.
Second, we have assumed an all-or-nothing pool. In practice, pools may be
formed with a subset of the relevant patents, which raises the interesting issue of
holdouts.
Third, we focused on the polar cases of a closed pool and pure third-party
licensing by the pool. The intermediate case of mixed third-party and member
licensing raises the issues of the impact of di®erential treatment among licensees
and of its consequences for the choice between cross licensing and pool formation.
Fourth, pools often seem to re°ect equal-treatment preoccupations despite
asymmetries in the importance of innovations, in the status of members (licensing
and non-licensing owners), or in the ability to clone another member's innovation;
theoretical work should be devoted to the understanding of equal treatment in
such circumstances.
Last, one would want to compare the merits of pools and standard setting
processes. These and the many other important questions related to pools lie
outside the limited scope of this paper, which we hope will encourage research in
these directions.
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41Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let m(P) denote the number of licenses for price con¯guration P (with p1 ·
p2 ·¢¢¢·pn). The second step of the user's optimization problem is to compare
µ + V (P) and 0.
(i) A ¯rst observation is that, if there are licenses in equilibrium, then all inde-
pendent licensors have positive sales. That is, for equilibrium prices, m(P)=n.
If this were not the case, licensor n (the highest price licensor by assumption)
would make no pro¯t and so would gain by charging any price exceeding 0 but
smaller than w(m(P) + 1), as such a price would induce users to license her
technology.
(ii) As already discussed, a licensor may be constrained either by the competition
margin or by the demand margin. So let us divide licensors accordingly: those,
i 2 NC, for which a marginal increase in the licensing fee would lead to an exclu-
sion of the patent from the users' basket and those, i 2 ND, for which this is not




















By the same reasoning as in Section 2, this implies that all licensors in ND charge
the same price pD. Licensors in NC need not charge the same price (although they
necessarily do in the concave case as they then charge w(n)). For expositional
simplicity we will focus on the symmetric case in which they all charge price pC
(results do not hinge on this).
Next suppose that pC <p D. Letting mC and mD denote the number of elements








fV (k + `) ¡ kpC ¡ `pDg
But the inequality implies that licensors in ND are competition constrained (they
can't raise their price without being excluded from the basket), a contradiction.
Last, it is easy to see that pC = pD: Because
Proof. pDD0 + D =0 ,
then
pCD0 + D< 0i f pC >p D,
and so licensors in the competition constrained set would be better o® lowering
their licensing fee.
Proof of Proposition 10
(i) To prove proposition 10, let us ¯rst show that the two members can make
an independent licensing provision irrelevant by structuring the royalty shares ®1
and ®2 (®1 + ®2 = 1) adequately.29
An unconstrained pool charges P ¤so as to solve
max
P
fPD(P ¡ V (2))g.




V (2) ¡ V (1)
P ¤ :
29This assumes that the members can always make a lump-sum transfer between themselves
in order to implement any desired pro¯t allocation. Lump sum transfers may not be needed
though: Owner 1 makes the monopoly pro¯t ¼¤
1 corresponding to the dominant patent before
they reach an agreement and so will insist on a higher royalty share. For example, under







2 of pool pro¯t ¼¤
2.
43Then, provided that owner 2 cannot license his patent individually without in-
fringing upon owner 1's intellectual property, the pool's optimal price P ¤ is not
upset by independent licensing. Owner 1 bene¯ts from selling independent li-
censes only if he charges price p1 that compensates for the lost pool royalties:
p1 ¸ ®1P
¤;
and that makes the independent license more attractive than the package license:
V (1) ¡ p1 ¸ V (2) ¡ P
¤.
These three inequalities are inconsistent.
(ii) Let e Pk denote the quality-adjusted price for k patents:
e P2 ´ P ¡ V (2) and e P1 ´ p1 ¡ V (1),












In the absence of a pool, owner 1 charges p1 and owner 2 charges p2, where
p2 · w(2) = V (2) ¡ V (1);
since patent 2 has no value on a stand-alone basis. Either p2 <w (2), and so
the demand margin binds for both patents. The same reasoning as in Section 3
then shows that a pool eliminates the double marginalization and therefore raises
welfare.
Or p2 = w(2), and so owner 1 solves
max
p1
fp1D(p1 + p2 ¡ V (2))g = max
p1
fp1D(p1 ¡ V (1))g.











Revealed preference implies that
e P1 > e P2;
and so users are better o® under a pool, which furthermore yields higher industry
pro¯t.¥
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